





In this chapter, I reject the appeal to exemplars of forgiveness on the part of 
those in positions of power in order to persuade those with less (or members 
of minorities that can be muscled by majorities) to forgive.1 My concern is 
to focus on the ways that speakers (nonvictim persuaders) use forgiveness 
exemplars to convince victims and not the ways in which victims use forgive-
ness exemplars to persuade themselves. I describe these speakers as making 
several rhetorical moves. I argue that in making such moves the speaker com-
mits basic fallacies of reasoning. In using these moves, the speaker focuses 
on examples and not morality, does not respect the rationality of the victims, 
and can make victims dependent on exemplars and not their own reason. I 
also argue against appealing to exemplars when doing so avoids messy de-
tails and is insincere. Avoiding messy details is problematic for the following 
reasons. By avoiding the messy details, we rob victims of their autonomy and 
we do not engage them in practical reasoning. In avoiding messy details, we 
can also idealize forgiveness by painting a picture of forgiveness that omits 
the impact of the harms done and the often-difficult work required of both 
the offender and victim to overcome the harm. In being insincere in our use 
of exemplars, we do not use the exemplar as a moral example but rather as a 
device to get victims to fall in line with what we desire. As a result, I claim 
that these rhetorical moves disempower victims.
EXEMPLARS AND US
We admire moral exemplars. They embody the moral excellence we strive to 
achieve. In our philosophical discussions about certain virtues, philosophers 
often rely on the use of moral exemplars. Glen Pettigrove2 uses Martin Luther 
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King Jr. and Gandhi as examples of those whom we admire for their meek-
ness. Martha Nussbaum3 uses Nelson Mandela as an example of generosity 
and as an example of a nonangry revolutionary. Hannah Arendt4 notes that 
forgiveness is a necessary corrective for damages and she makes the bold 
claim that Jesus of Nazareth not only embodied forgiveness, but also invented 
it. The use of exemplars is not only present in philosophical texts but often 
used in everyday conversations concerning moral matters.
A 2016 CBS news report titled “Innocent Man Ends Up Pals with Crooked 
Cop that Framed Him” illustrates the practice of using exemplars to persuade 
and inspire.5 Steve Hartman reports that in 2005, Officer Andre Collins ar-
rested Jameel McGee in Michigan for dealing drugs. However, Officer Col-
lins falsified the police report, and by doing so he put an innocent man behind 
bars. McGee did four years in prison for a crime he did not commit. Collins’s 
lies would eventually catch up with him and he ended up doing over a year in 
prison for falsifying reports, among other crimes. Years later, Collins apolo-
gized and the article reports that that was all McGee needed to hear to forgive. 
McGee noted that he forgave Officer Collins for both their sakes. The two 
now give speeches on forgiveness. The article ends by stating, “And clearly, 
if these two guys from the coffee shop can set aside their bitter grounds, 
what’s our excuse?” Although Hartman seems to have written the article to 
motivate and challenge people to forgive, his use of moral exemplars is prob-
lematic because he uses the fact that McGee forgave as a decisive reason for 
readers to forgive. By doing so, the author not only idealizes the forgiveness 
process, but also seeks to convince us to make moral judgments based on 
examples alone. This, I will argue, does not respect the autonomy of victims. 
The article, however, is not alone in its misuse of forgiveness exemplars. The 
rhetoric the article employs is very common. It is this kind of exemplar case 
that I will focus on in this chapter.
Immanuel Kant argues that exemplars are useful for moral education, in-
spiration, and emulation, but he also recognizes that they are not sufficient. 
On my reading of Kant, following moral exemplars as our primary reason for 
action is problematic. By claiming that forgiveness exemplars are sufficient 
for practicing forgiveness, I argue, “speakers” do not use moral exemplars ap-
propriately. Instead of inspiring those who hear their forgiveness arguments, 
this kind of rhetorical strategy disempowers victims. For example, Hartman 
omits important information that is needed for readers to fully deliberate by 
painting an idealized picture of forgiveness, and by doing so he avoids the 
messiness that is often involved when a victim is wronged and when he or 
she undergoes the process of forgiveness. A speaker uses moral exemplars 
inappropriately when he or she claims that we should forgive because Collins 
and McGee or Mandela and King practiced forgiveness.
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In this chapter, I argue that while moral exemplars are useful, we must 
be careful in our use of them. I focus on forgiveness exemplars as my para-
digmatic case. I first describe forgiveness exemplars that are often used to 
persuade victims to forgive such as Nelson Mandela, King, and Jesus of 
Nazareth. I also explain how, for Kant, highlighting these figures as moral 
exemplars can be useful. I then explain two kinds of rhetorical strategies that 
are used when attempting to convince victims to forgive. Last, I explain (à 
la Kant) how the use of these moral exemplars do not empower but instead 
disempowers victims. I do not claim that we ought not use forgiveness ex-
emplars; rather, we should be careful how and why we employ exemplars 
in our forgiveness arguments. By “forgiveness arguments,” I do not mean 
the logical enterprise that is restricted to professional philosophers. I think 
that everyday people articulate forgiveness arguments in the public domain 
(for example, in the media) as well as in the private domain (for example, in 
intimate conversations) when they attempt to use reasons to persuade victims 
to forgive. Borrowing from Kant, I also offer suggestions for the appropriate 
use of forgiveness exemplars.
FORGIVENESS EXEMPLARS
Several historical figures come to mind when we think of forgiveness. They 
include Nelson Mandela, Martin Luther King Jr., and Jesus of Nazareth. 
These figures were not only people who practiced forgiveness in private, but 
their public practice and teachings also helped to achieve radical change.
Former South African president Nelson Mandela is a symbol of forgive-
ness. Decades before his presidency, he was sentenced to hard labor for life 
for the charge of conspiracy to overthrow the government through violence. 
As leader of the African National Congress (ANC), Mandela had fought to 
end white minority rule in apartheid South Africa. Having gone to prison as a 
man known to use violence, he arose as a symbol of peace. Although he was 
locked away for decades, Mandela is believed to have emerged from prison 
without bitterness. Instead of seeking revenge on whites, he believed that 
reconciliation was the only thing that could solve the racial divide in South 
Africa. Several examples of Mandela’s forgiveness have been publicly noted. 
Mandela invited one of his former guards to his inauguration ceremony. He 
invited his former jailer to the dinner that celebrated his twentieth anniversary 
of being released from prison. He also invited Percy Yutar, the state prosecu-
tor who demanded Mandela get the death penalty, to a dinner. While dinners 
may seem insignificant, grassroots initiatives in post-apartheid South Africa 
such as Koinonia Southern Africa have used dining together as an opportunity 
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for reconciliation. We can say that Mandela forgave jailers, lawyers, and a 
government that once hated and mistreated him and his fellow natives. It is 
believed that his public practice of forgiveness is responsible for reconciling 
a nation once stifled by the unfair, dehumanizing, and even deadly practices 
of apartheid.
Martha Nussbaum argues that Mandela never spoke about forgiveness at 
all but framed his efforts in different terms. On her view, Mandela embodied 
more of an unconditional generosity than an unconditional forgiveness. She 
claims that Mandela did not engage in payback; instead his treatment of oth-
ers shows “generosity and forgetfulness of past wrongs.”6 However, I think 
that Nussbaum’s reading of Mandela’s actions, as a display of generosity and 
not forgiveness, is in error. Mandela actually displays Butlerian forgiveness. 
For British moralist Joseph Butler, forgiveness is a moderation of resentment 
and the refusal to engage in payback.7 It entails compassion and seeing the 
offender as still part of humanity. Mandela displayed Butlerian forgiveness 
because he refused to pay back the guards who mistreated him. He had 
compassion for them and other whites. He still considered whites as part of 
the moral community despite their complicity and participation in apartheid. 
While Nussbaum notes that Mandela never used the word “forgiveness,”8 it 
seems that based on a Butlerian view of forgiveness, forgiveness is something 
that Mandela practiced.
Another exemplar of forgiveness is Martin Luther King Jr. Dr. King was a 
pastor and civil rights leader. As a leader of the Southern Christian Leader-
ship Committee, he worked with others to end segregation laws in the South. 
Later in his life, he would fight for the rights of the poor. Unlike Mandela, 
King used the word “forgiveness.” He repeatedly spoke about forgiveness 
in his sermons (documented in “Strength to Love” and “Radical King”). For 
King, to love our enemies required the capacity to forgive. Forgiveness cre-
ates an atmosphere for a new beginning. King notes that when we forgive, we 
forget, in the sense that the evil deed is no longer a mental block impeding a 
new relationship. King thought that the evil deed of an agent never expresses 
fully who they are.9 This leads us from hate to love for we are reminded that 
the offender is not beyond redemptive love. King admits that we “are tempted 
to become bitter and to retaliate with a corresponding hate” but that “the dark-
ness of racial injustice will be dispelled only by the light of forgiving love.”10
King not only preached forgiveness but he practiced it. In 1956, Izola 
Curry stabbed King. Roy James, a lieutenant of the American Nazi Party, 
attacked King in 1962 at a rally in Alabama. He forgave them. Similar to 
Joseph Butler, King recognized that we should extend pity to the offender 
because in the offender hurting another, he also hurts himself. Butler states, 
“no one ever did a designed injury to another but at the same time he did a 
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much greater injury to himself, he [should be] an object of compassion.”11 If 
forgiveness is the forswearing of negative emotions, King surely forswore 
bitterness and resentment. If, according to Macalester Bell,12 forgiveness is 
not only the forswearing of resentment but also of contempt (she calls this 
Forgiveness-C), King also practiced forgiveness by refusing to exclude Curry 
and James from the moral community. In eulogizing Martin Luther King Jr., 
Morehouse College president Benjamin Mays stated, “here was a man who 
believed . . . that violence is self-defeating; and that only love and forgiveness 
can break the vicious circle of revenge.”13
A forgiveness exemplar for Martin Luther King Jr. was Jesus of Nazareth. 
King often used the example of Jesus in sermons such as “Love in Action,” 
“Love and Forgiveness,” and “Loving Your Enemies.” The Christian Gospels 
depict Jesus as one who practiced forgiveness. According to the Gospels, 
Jesus instructed his followers to model their forgiveness on divine forgive-
ness. He argued that if we forgive, then the father would forgive us (Luke 
6:37–38, Luke 17:35). When asked how many times we should forgive each 
other, Jesus replied, “seven times seventy.” Christians believe that Jesus 
lived and then died on the cross to be a sacrifice for the forgiveness of their 
sins, for it was his dying on the cross that would allow them to be forgiven 
and redeemed. Jesus forgave the sins of the adulterous and paralyzed (Mark 
2:1–12). While dying on the cross, he did not ask God to avenge those who 
were crucifying and mocking him; instead Jesus asked God to forgive them 
“for they know not what they do” (Luke 23:34). Jeffrie Murphy argues that 
the ignorance of offenders gives us reason to excuse them but not to forgive 
them. Thus Jesus’s statement would go better as “Father, excuse them for 
they know not what they do.”14 While Murphy and others claim that Jesus 
actually pardoned offenders instead of forgave offenders, I do not have space 
to take up this controversy here. The claim that Jesus was philosophically 
sloppy in his use of forgiveness does not negate the fact that there are rea-
sons why many still read him as preaching forgiveness. There is also textual 
evidence that lead many to conclude that he was an exemplar of forgiveness.
MORAL EXEMPLARS AND KANT
These forgiveness exemplars do not just make for a good story in the prac-
tice of forgiveness. For philosophers including Kant, moral exemplars are 
helpful, and Kant has several things to say about what moral exemplars can 
do. A moral exemplar, according to Kant, is someone who lives his or her 
life according to the moral law. They strike down our pride, inspire respect, 
and are a source of encouragement. How are they able to do this? When we 
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see someone as an example of the moral law, Kant notes in the Critique of 
Practical Reason that “[he or she] holds before me a law that strikes down 
my self-conceit when I compare it with my conduct, and I see observance of 
that law and hence its practicability proved before me in fact.”15 For Kant, 
moral feeling (Achtung) is caused by the moral law and it is produced when 
we recognize the weight of the moral law and its power to overpower our 
inclinations. Interestingly, humans can arouse the feeling of Achtung just as 
the moral law arouses it. Richard Dean writes:
Given that the source of Achtung is the Categorical Imperative itself, and its 
power to overbalance inclinations, it is perhaps surprising that Kant maintains 
that humans can arouse this same feeling of Achtung. But Kant does repeatedly 
say this, and explains that the feature of a person that inspires Achtung is her 
commitment to the Categorical Imperative’s moral demands. In a famous pas-
sage from the Critique of Practical Reason (5:77–78), Kant says that “before a 
humble common man in whom I perceive uprightness of character in a higher 
degree than I am aware of in myself, my spirit bows,” because “Achtung is a 
tribute that we cannot refuse to pay to merit.” The source of Achtung for persons 
is the same as Achtung for moral law, namely, the power of morality to outweigh 
all of a person’s contrary inclinations. . . . Even the example of Jesus as an “ideal 
of moral perfection” (R 6:61) really serves only to direct our attention to an 
idea of possible moral perfection that “is present as model already in our own 
reason” (R 6:62). So, Achtung for people who provide good moral examples has 
the same source and serves the same purposes as Achtung for moral law itself.16
Moral exemplars strike down our pride because when we compare the 
conduct of exemplars to our own conduct, we are reminded of how far we 
may be from representing the moral law. We are humbled. However, moral 
exemplars also inspire respect for morality. Moral exemplars do not them-
selves inspire such respect, qua persons or personalities. Moral exemplars 
are not morality themselves; instead they show or hold before us a law. For 
Kant this brings about a kind of respect. “Respect is a tribute that we cannot 
refuse to pay to merit, whether we want to or not; we may indeed withhold it 
outwardly but we still cannot help feel it inwardly.”17 Our respect for moral 
exemplars is not an uncritical admiration; rather, it is a respect for the moral 
law that the exemplars represent. Moreover, the fact that they are able to live 
life according to the moral law serves as encouragement that we too can do 
the same. As Dean notes, moral exemplars “elevat[e] us by demonstrating the 
possibility of acting morally despite contrary inclinations.”18
For Kant, moral exemplars are useful for moral education because they 
humble us, point us toward the moral law, and encourage us in being moral. 
We are not born as autonomous agents. We must develop our rational capaci-
ties. Young children, because of their youth, have not developed their rational 
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capacities fully. So exposing them to examples can help develop their ability 
to control their inclinations. Kant writes in the Metaphysics of Morals, “the 
experimental means for cultivating virtue is [a] good example on the part of 
the teacher and [a] cautionary example in others, since, for a still undeveloped 
human being, imitation is the first determination of his will to accept maxims 
that he afterwards makes for himself.”19 According to Kant, moral exemplars 
can serve as a good example as well as a cautionary example.
Even when we become autonomous moral agents, the fact that we have 
an image-dependent understanding will require the use of exemplars. Kant 
believes that to think abstractly we need images. Kant’s solution is that we 
represent moral concepts symbolically and analogically through images.20 In 
the Groundwork he writes,
It is admittedly a limitation of human reason . . . that we conceive of no consid-
erable moral worth in the actions of a personal being without representing that 
person, or his manifestation in human guise. This is not to assert that such worth 
is in itself so conditioned, but merely that we must always resort to some anal-
ogy with natural beings in order to make supersensible qualities comprehensible 
to ourselves.21
Thus moral exemplars are images that represent to us the moral law. Without 
these examples, it will be difficult for us to comprehend morality.
In Kant and the Ethics of Humility, Jeanine Greenberg argues that Kant 
thinks moral exemplars are useful because principles cannot guide our moral 
character. She claims that because “finite rational agents are not able to ap-
preciate the full and perfect process of the internalization of these principles” 
we need examples.22 She notes, “Although finite rational agents can derive 
from principles some basic guides to character, experience is too large to 
allow me to deduce my entire moral character from the terms of these prin-
ciples.” On Greenberg’s reading of Kant, “finite rational agents seeking to 
internalize moral principles into their characters need, then, not just a regula-
tive ideal in the sense of a guiding principle; they need also a regulative ideal 
in the sense of a guiding person.”23 In other words, exemplars, unlike sole a 
priori principles, can show me contextual ways of putting in practice these 
principles. Therefore we need not just the principles but examples that model 
these principles.
Moral exemplars are also useful for hope and inspiration. Exemplars give 
us hope and inspiration that what morality demands is humanly achievable.24 
Kant notes, “Examples put beyond doubt the feasibility of what the law de-
mands.”25 He also states that the example of a teacher serves as “proof of the 
feasibility of that which is in accordance with duty.”26 In others words, ex-
emplars give us inspiration because they show us that morality is achievable. 
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This is not to say that we can only know the moral law through examples. 
From a logical point of view, we cannot know or prove moral principles 
through these empirical examples. However, from an anthropological point 
of view, examples give us hope that humans can act morally.27 As Green-
berg notes, “individual standard provides an image of perfection . . . and it 
provides an image of possibilities.”28 They point us to moral possibilities. 
Although it is the moral law that tells us that it is possible (ought implies 
can), “a mere principle to pursue self-perfection is not going to be sufficient 
to reveal the myriad ways and depths through which an individual person 
could—and should—pursue it.”29 Moral principles tell us what is possible, 
and in the context of forgiveness, moral examples reveal to us the variety of 
contexts and situations we can respond to, the variety of objects we can for-
give, and the many ways in which we can put forgiveness in practice.
Kant also believes that exemplars serve the purpose of emulation. Human 
examples give us a tangible ideal to aim for. These moral exemplars should 
be emulated but they should not be imitated. At first glance, emulation and 
imitation appear to be synonymous. However, there is a distinction for Kant. 
When a moral agent imitates another’s behavior, he or she is copying be-
havior but not thinking why he or she is a good moral example in the first 
place. That is why Kant states that “imitation has no place at all in matters of 
morality.”30 However, when we emulate, we do not emulate the person per 
se, but rather the ideal of reason that the person represents and makes visible 
to us.31 In other words, it is the moral law and not the person that we emulate.
WHEN THE USE OF FORGIVENESS  
EXEMPLARS GOES WRONG
So far I have provided a description of popular forgiveness exemplars. I have 
also described the ways in which these moral exemplars can aid our moral 
education, serve as hope and inspiration, and represent to us the moral law. 
It will seem thus far that using these figures as forgiveness exemplars is not 
problematic at all; rather, they aid in helping us to live a moral life. In what 
follows, I will evaluate arguments that the fact that exemplars have forgiven 
others or that the exemplars recommend that we should forgive is reason to 
forgive. I will also provide (à la Kant) reasons for why I think the use of the 
rhetoric disempowers victims.
Although Greenberg’s focus in Kant and the Ethics of Humility is on 
moral affirmation of self-other comparisons, she does provide us with ways 
in which the use of exemplars can go wrong. She notes that moral exemplars 
can make us morally complacent. Instead of focusing on the first-person 
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pursuit of moral development, we can rely on moral exemplars to do all the 
work for us. Of course, this can only happen because we imagine that they 
can actually do it for us and not because they actually can do the work of 
moral development for us. She also notes that we can look at moral exemplars 
with only aesthetic admiration. In this way, we only appreciate the ideal they 
present to us instead of doing the work of actually attending to our own char-
acter. We can also overidealize moral exemplars and this can create feelings 
of inferiority and superiority. Greenberg thinks, by conceiving of exemplars 
as superior, it can lead us to become uncritical followers instead of moral 
agents. I imagine that we can also feel inferior by an exemplar, and instead 
of being encouraged in the possibility of moral excellence, we could be so 
overwhelmed by the character of others in comparison to our own that we get 
discouraged from living a moral life.
Note that Greenberg’s examples of when the use of moral exemplars can 
go wrong is connected more to the ways in which a moral agent uses moral 
exemplars and not the ways in which speakers employ moral exemplars in 
their moral arguments. “Nelson Mandela forgave,” “Martin Luther King Jr. 
practiced forgiveness,” and “What would Jesus do?” are familiar claims and 
rhetorical questions used when attempting to convince others—often victims 
of oppression—to forgive. The speaker’s strategy is to use moral exemplars 
to convince the victim to forgive. I think this rhetorical strategy can make 
two kinds of moves: 1) the authority move and 2) the “their suffering is worse 
than yours” move. The speaker utilizes the authority move when he or she 
provides as a forgiveness exemplar someone whom the victim looks to as an 
authority figure and as a result is inclined to follow him or her unquestion-
ingly. By doing so, the speaker utilizes the exemplar as a model, recognizing 
that one is more likely to be inspired to become like those who have a certain 
type of authority in the moral community. While Kant believes that we could 
come to respect moral exemplars as representations of the moral law, the 
speaker’s strategy in the authority move is to convince the victim to follow 
the authority figure uncritically. The speaker argues that the victim should 
model the moral exemplar not because they necessarily represent the moral 
law, but because they are an authority figure. The exemplars are usually 
leaders of social causes such as King and Mandela. The speaker argues that 
forgiveness exemplars are supposed to serve as a reminder that if one is com-
mitted to the cause (for example, justice, equality, and love), one will do as 
the leader of the cause has done or as the leader instructs them to do: forgive.
The strategy in the “their suffering is worse than yours” move is to provide 
a forgiveness exemplar who suffered more than the victim did. It implies 
that if the moral exemplar suffered more than the victim—who is assumed 
to have suffered less—he or she should forgive for that reason alone. The 
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move is made to convince the victim not merely that it is possible to forgive, 
but that the victim’s circumstances warrant forgiveness by the fact that the 
circumstances are less extreme than the circumstances of the moral exemplar.
My first set of criticisms of this kind of rhetoric focuses on argumentation 
and fallacious reasoning. I am not arguing that examples have no place in 
moral arguments. In general, examples fulfill the job of illustrating principles. 
They make reasons clearer. Examples make it easier to understand the general 
rule. For example, for the conclusion “for the good of the moral community, 
members of the moral community should forgive,” I may use as a premise 
the proposition that “forgiveness reconciles the offender and the victim.” As 
an example to illustrate this point, I may highlight Nelson Mandela’s efforts, 
challenges, and results to show how and that forgiveness can reconcile of-
fenders and victims. The example illustrates the proposition and aids in its un-
derstanding. The example itself (“Nelson Mandela forgave”) is not a premise; 
rather, it is only an example that illustrates a particular premise.
My main criticism of the forgiveness rhetoric explained here is that the 
rhetorical appeal does not make this kind of argument. Instead the forgiveness 
exemplar is held up to persuade the victim motivationally to act in a certain 
way, rather than illustrating a general principle that the victim may or may not 
accept as applying to his or her case. The exemplars become reasons to accept 
the normative claim that the victim should forgive instead of just illustrating 
the moral law. This is an improper use of examples in moral argumentation 
if we aim to avoid fallacious reasoning.
The authority move is a classic appeal to authority. Appeal to authority is 
fallacious reasoning that claims that we should accept the truth of a conclu-
sion simply because an authority figure said we should. We should forgive 
simply because Jesus said we should forgive or we should forgive because 
King also forgave. It takes no consideration of what the moral law requires. 
In certain ways, these moves contain the adage that victims should “follow 
their leaders” instead of follow the moral law. This kind of rhetoric does 
not empower victims but instead disempowers them. Instead of arguing that 
victims should forgive for rational reasons, it assumes that they have more 
reason to follow a leader than to follow their own reasoning. The move advo-
cates an uncritical and irrational respect for authority, while Kant argues for 
a rational respect for authority. In the former, for Kant, we are immature. In 
the latter, we are mature. Kant notes in “What Is Enlightenment?” that when 
we have an uncritical respect for authority, it shows that we do not have the 
courage to use our own understanding. We lack the resolution to use our 
own understanding without the guidance of another. It is the dogmas of the 
exemplars and not our understanding of the moral principles that guide us. 
In doing so, the authority figures’ dogmas become the ball and chain of “our 
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permanent immaturity.”32 However, when we have a rational respect for an 
exemplar, we follow their example because we recognize that it mirrors the 
moral law. Instead of inviting victims to be autonomous, these arguments in-
vite victims to be heteronomous. I will say more later about how this rhetoric 
disempowers victims, but I think criticisms of student protests against racism 
across U.S. college campuses provide us with an example of this move. In 
2016, Clemson University students protested for diversity on their campus 
by staging a nine-day outdoor sit-in. In an open letter criticizing students, Dr. 
David Woodard wrote: “The main difference between the ‘See the Stripes’ 
[student protestors] beliefs and Martin Luther King, Jr. is that the latter had a 
moral premise for his actions. . . . The only pastor to have a national holiday 
named after him emphasized forgiveness, not retribution. . . . Their words and 
actions have none of the markings of Martin Luther King, Jr.”33 The profes-
sor is suggesting that the protestors have reasons to forgive because Martin 
Luther King Jr. forgave. Woodard uses King as an authority figure to appeal 
to and he implicitly suggests that King would agree with his criticisms of the 
protestors.
The authority move argues that the fact that exemplars forgave is reason for 
the victim to forgive. Instead of the following argument:
P1: Forgiveness reconciles the offender to the victim (for example, Mandela 
post-apartheid).
P2: Forgiveness aids in the psychological health of the victim (for example, civil 
rights activists).
C: Therefore we should forgive at least for prudential reasons.
The speaker employs the authority move by arguing:
P1: Jesus forgave.
P2: Whatever Jesus did, we should do.
C: Therefore we should forgive.
We need P2 for the argument to work. However, it is precisely this premise 
that causes the problem. When using the authority move, the speaker disem-
powers the victim by inviting him or her to ignore, dismiss, or be unaware 
of morality. For Kant, exemplars do not alone show that we can do it and 
that therefore we ought to do it. They do not prove morality is possible. It is 
the moral law (that is, ought) that informs us of what we can do. Empirical 
examples are not enough to prove a priori propositions. An overreliance on 
moral exemplars can lead us to commit the authority move to the point that 
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exemplars become our only reason for acting and we no longer have the abil-
ity to make moral judgments. Kant refers to this idea through his use of the 
go-cart analogy. He notes that the overuse of examples can “weaken the effort 
of the understanding to gain sufficient insight into the rules in the universal 
and independently of the particular circumstances of experience.”34 A go-cart 
is like a walker. Go-carts were used to teach babies how to walk with the 
hope that they would eventually no longer depend on the go-cart. However, 
an overreliance on a go-cart could in turn weaken the baby’s ability to walk 
just as an overreliance on crutches could weaken an injured teenager’s abil-
ity to recover. We could eventually get so deeply invested in the authority 
move that none of our premises consist of rational reasons but only forgive-
ness exemplars. By doing so, moral exemplars become the proper criteria for 
morality instead of morality itself. Speakers who invite victims to give in to 
the authority move can disempower victims to the point that they are unable 
to make moral judgments absent moral examples.
In addition, the appeal to authority can be insincere and not in good faith. 
It is possible that Woodard and others do not really know what King actu-
ally said about forgiveness. It is also possible that Woodard and others have 
not consulted enough resources to adequately predict what King would say 
about the students’ perceived lack of forgiveness. The speaker’s only use of 
the forgiveness exemplar is to get the victim to behave as the speaker would 
want him or her to. In the authority move, the speaker could use the exemplar 
as another way to criticize and to punish victims. The speaker can do this 
while also ignoring that in particular cases King might advise protestors not 
to forgive for decisive reasons.
The “their suffering is worse than yours move” commits the fallacy of appeal 
to emotion. In the coffee shop employees’ case, the writer seemed to be ask-
ing, “If someone who was wrongfully imprisoned can forgive, then shouldn’t 
we who suffer less than four years of wrongful imprisonment follow their ex-
ample?” By participating in the “their suffering is worse than yours move,” the 
speaker may characterize the suffering that the forgiveness exemplars underwent 
(for example, Mandela’s imprisonment, King’s assaults, and Jesus’s death). The 
speaker highlights the exemplar’s decision to forgive in spite of the pain in order 
to elicit emotions in victims to get them to accept the truth of the speaker’s con-
clusion. In both the appeal to authority and appeal to emotions, the speaker does 
not present arguments to victims as rational beings but rather as irrational beings 
who are not responsive to rational reasons but are only emotionally vulnerable. 
Kant is notorious for his criticism of the use of emotions as reasons for acting. 
Kant argues that reason should be our guide and not emotions. We should act 
morally because the moral law commands it, not because we feel like it. Barbara 
Herman35 thinks that Kant is not dismissing emotions altogether. On her view, 
we can have inclinations, but reason ought to be our primary motive. While I 
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have previously disagreed with Kant on his dismissal of emotions, Herman helps 
me to see that Kant and I have more in common than I thought. Like Aristotle, 
I believe that emotions should be directed to the right object, at the right time, 
and to the right degree. I also believe in emotional cognition; I think emotions 
have objects and they are judgments.36 I do not see emotions detached from rea-
son, and if they were, I would not argue for or defend them as I do. While our 
projects, aims, and conceptions are different, Kant and I agree that reason and 
emotion have or should have a relationship in morality. For this reason, any at-
tempt at using emotion outside of the bounds of reason is something with which 
we both disagree.
I agree with Kant that our exercise of reason is true freedom. Any use of emo-
tions that disempower victims by inviting them to be less free should be chal-
lenged. The above rhetoric does disempower victims in this way. When anyone 
uses emotionally manipulative means to move us to act, we are not responding 
in the freedom that reason leads us to. Instead we are manipulated with the 
emotions of guilt, pity, or sadness. In some ways, we are no longer ends at this 
point but means, for our emotions are used to get us to respond in ways that the 
speaker desires. Once again, the speaker—with our emotions—does not assume 
that we are autonomous agents who are able to figure out what is the right thing 
to do within ourselves. Rather, they assume that we require a heteronomous 
source (sources outside of ourselves such as people or actions). The speaker 
assumes that victims are only able to understand what to do because others tell 
them what to do or because the exemplars have done it themselves. The speaker 
may also think that the victim will be better moved by emotions than by reason.
Additionally, the rhetoric also assumes that victims are immature. Im-
maturity, for Kant, is allowing others to do the thinking for us. He defines 
immaturity as the “inability to use one’s understanding without the guidance 
of another.”37 It may be convenient to be immature so I need not make any 
efforts at all. If I am to think that I ought to forgive because a particular ex-
emplar told me I should or because he or she forgave, there is little effort that 
I need to take to understand why forgiveness is something I should practice. 
Immaturity is not something we inherit because we are human or because 
we lack understanding. It is only self-incurred when we lack the resolution 
and courage to think for ourselves. By encouraging immaturity by using the 
above rhetoric, a speaker disempowers victims by inviting them to remain in 
their self-incurred immaturity instead of entering into enlightenment.
My second set of criticisms of this kind of rhetoric focuses on the insuffi-
ciency of exemplars. Here I would like to go into further detail about examples 
and elaborate on claims I have presented earlier but only briefly discussed. 
For Kant, morality is an unconditional command that tells us to act lawfully, 
period. We discover what this “ought” is through our rational capacity. If we 
ought to do it, that means we can do it. I have argued that the use of King, 
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Mandela, Jesus, and other forgiveness exemplars can go wrong when they are 
used not as examples of a premise, but when the fact that the exemplars have 
forgiven others becomes a reason itself. Forgiveness exemplars lack a certain 
kind of qualification to serve as reasons to forgive. Examples are not enough to 
serve as reasons themselves, for even examples must be judged to be a fitting 
example by morality. Kant writes, “every example of it represented to me must 
itself first be appraised in accordance with principles of morality, as to whether 
it is also worthy to serve as an original example, that is, as a model; it can by 
no means authoritatively provide the concept of morality.”38 If forgiveness 
exemplars should be judged according to a moral standard itself, then the fact 
that they forgave others or they recommend that we should forgive cannot be 
a reason to forgive. This is so because the exemplars presuppose the presence 
and primacy of a moral law by which they should be judged.
Earlier I introduced the “follow your leader” assumption that is embedded 
in the authority move and the “their suffering is worse than yours” move. I 
will now apply that assumption in making the distinction between imitation 
and emulation. When a speaker makes the authority move by using only 
forgiveness exemplars as premises, he or she may assume two things: 1) the 
power of the exemplar alone to convince victims or 2) the powerlessness of 
the victim to follow moral laws instead of moral examples alone. In assum-
ing that victims will “follow their leader” by accepting the authority move 
argument, the speaker invites victims to imitate and not emulate. Someone 
who imitates another looks at an exemplar’s life in order to model it. They are 
unaware of the reasons for doing it. On the other hand, to emulate forgiveness 
exemplars is to adopt their practice of forgiveness and also understand and 
accept the moral reasons for doing so. An empowered victim does not merely 
follow the leader when making moral decisions. Instead he or she follows the 
moral law and only takes moral exemplars to be a representation of the law 
as well as a source of hope and inspiration.
POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
One possible objection to my argument is that the rhetoric that I speak of is 
not something that philosophers would engage in. My interlocutor may claim 
that people may talk in sloppy ways, but no one thinks this is how we should 
reason. Philosophers are careful with argumentation and will never use ex-
emplars as reasons to forgive. This objection makes several assumptions. It 
assumes that philosophers are always more careful than ordinary people in 
their arguments. It does not take into account that philosophers often find 
themselves in unreflective movements as reactive human beings often do. In 
our interpersonal conversations, we are not always as careful as we should 
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be. Beyond the philosophical literature, as I indicated earlier, there are media 
outlets that do commit these mistakes (for example, news articles and tele-
vision and video web programming) and they are influential. My argument 
aims to convince everyone in the moral community to be careful with the use 
of forgiveness exemplars.
Another objection may be that the speaker—in using these moves—is not 
intending to disempower victims but rather is intending to persuade them 
to stretch their moral capacities—to forgive where we might think it is im-
possible to forgive—rather than to pressure victims. This objection follows 
a Kantian framework, for if what matters for Kant is not our actions but 
our motives, then surely we cannot say that a speaker disempowers others 
when his or her only intention is to convince victims to practice forgiveness 
on moral grounds. I do not think this is an accurate reading of Kant. Kant 
thinks that we cannot always be sure what our true intentions are. He writes 
in Groundwork, “Though much may be done in conformity with what duty 
commands, still it is always doubtful whether it is really done from duty and 
therefore has moral worth.”39 He continues, “It is absolutely impossible . . . to 
make out with complete certainty [in which a moral action] rested simply on 
moral grounds.”40 Therefore it is possible to think that I intend to encourage 
others to forgive for “forgiveness’s sake,” but I could actually be intending 
to take their power away from coming to that decision through their own 
rational means. In addition, I think that our words (including our arguments) 
can have an effect on others despite our best intentions. For example, a racist 
joke that was told to be funny can still be racist—even if the speaker did not 
intend the joke to be racist. Likewise, a speaker could still make these rhetori-
cal moves and in doing so disempower victims, although his or her intentions 
were to inspire victims to forgive.
My interlocutor may also object to my argument on the basis that only 
a Kantian will be convinced of my argument. While I have used Kant as a 
resource in communicating the uses and dangers of forgiveness exemplars, 
one does not need to be a Kantian to accept my argument. By utilizing Kant, I 
have not argued that one ought to follow the universal law or that only inten-
tions matter in morality. I have argued that anyone concerned with rationality, 
respect for reasons, reasonableness, and respect for victims will have reason 
to be convinced of my argument.
CONCLUSION
The specific examples I have provided in this chapter highlight the inappro-
priate ways in which a reporter and a critic employ exemplars. Each speaker 
uses different rhetorical moves and they have different motives for doing so. 
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However, in the end they achieve the same result: they disempower victims. 
So how should we make use of forgiveness exemplars in our arguments? 
While I do not think making use of forgiveness exemplars is a moral sin, 
when we do make use of them we should do it with sincerity and great care. 
This includes recognizing that forgiveness exemplars can represent morality, 
inspire and give hope to others, be something to emulate, and can aid in moral 
education. While they can do all of the aforementioned, as well as illustrate 
and provide clarity to the premises of our forgiveness arguments, their actions 
and recommendations should not be taken as decisive reasons to forgive. Any 
use of forgiveness exemplars in this way can disempower victims and thus 
it is inappropriate. When those in positions of power attempt to persuade the 
powerless to forgive by using exemplars, we have reasons to view their argu-
ments as extremely dubious.
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